Where Now for Messi and Barça?

Lionel Messi’s under-par performances in the latter stages of the World Cup in Brazil has sparked an increasingly hostile debate, in the wake of Argentina defeat to Germany at the Maracana - with many critics pointing at a serious loss of form originating from the second half of last season at Barça.

But Messi’s, and by extension Barcelona’s, problems were more deep rooted than a mere loss of form during the second half of last season. The Argentine’s tribulations were simply symbiotic with the metaphorical car crash that was Barcelona last season.

Neymar’s arrival last summer, amid a variety of hype and fanfare, was met with indignation by Messi’s influential father, with widespread derision at the arrival of the €80m+ Brazilian (The figure was not, never was, nor ever will be, the €34m reported by Barça) being reported from within the Messi camp.

Barça's olive branch, astonishingly, was to cede to Messi Senior’s demands that his preferred choice of replacement for the outgoing Tito Vilanova, was to be his hero from Newell’s Old Boys, in Rosario; Gerardo Martino. This seemingly placated the Messi camp; satisfied that with their man at the helm, Messi’s future hegemony at Camp Nou was safely secured.

But this proved to be only the beginning of a season that was riven with strife at the Camp Nou. The strain which had already been evident during the Neymar deal, between the club and Messi’s camp,was only exacerbated a month into the season, with the arrest of Messi’s father on tax evasion charges. This had come only months after both Messi and his father were ordered to pay back €5m to the Spanish Government. Then, in December Messi Senior was arrested again - this time for alleged involvement in a money laundering scheme for a Colombian drugs cartel. Throughout all of this was the season long, protracted battle over Messi’s new contract.

Leo Messi's influential father, Jorge, has been ever present throughout his son's career.

Messi’s Season

Barcelona’s management of Lionel Messi, since he burst upon the world stage, has been essentially a ticking time bomb. When Alejandro Sabella took over the Argentinian National Team in 2011, one of the people from whom he immediately sought counsel was Messi’s mentor, and then coach; Pep Guardiola. Desperate to find a means through which Messi could begin replicating his feats for Barça in international football, Sabella had reached out to the one man who knew the intricacies of what it took to maximise the extraordinary innate talents of the genius from Rosario.

Guardiola’s response was an interesting insight into how to motivate the mercurial genius; “Give Leo the armband and never, ever substitute him. EVER.” But this was no meaningless, light hearted exchange between two acquaintances; his appearance record under Guardiola was astonishing.

Lionel Messi's Appearance and Goal statistics from 2008-13

But what makes it so astonishing, was perhaps the longest run of good fortune any player operating at the peak of his powers has ever enjoyed. Messi’s treatment by opposition players has at times, over the last half decade, been nothing short of barbaric. The worst of these was undoubtedly the 2008 Classico, at Camp Nou, where Juande Ramos’ shamed Real Madrid side carried out one of the most concerted efforts to kick a player out of the game ever witnessed. The real miracle has been Messi’s extraordinary propensity to avoid any serious long term injury.

Guardiola’s method of managing Messi was simple. If Messi is fit, then Messi plays. And play he did - with Tito Vilanova merely continuing in the same vein as his predecessor in 2012, as Messi played one game shy of 270 competitive games for Barça, in a five year period. Playing no fewer than 50 games for five consecutive seasons. Eventually, without an adequate system of managing Messi’s prodigious talent this was going to catch up with him. Eventually, something was going to have to give. And it inevitably did - as soon as Martino arrived at the Camp Nou.

Interestingly, Barça's concession in appointing Martino as new manager was a double edged ploy. As well as placating the concerns of Messi’s camp fearing that their nose being put out of joint by the arrival of Neymar, they believed that Martino’s relationship with Messi’s father afforded their new manager a certain latitude in dealing with their prized possession. Martino spoke openly about reducing the playing time of Messi; removing him in games which, in effect, were already won, and looking at ways of improving his periods of recovery between action.

Messi suffered an injured thigh during Barça's opening game of the season against Atletico at Camp Nou. He returned a week later to play in the second leg. In late September he suffered a muscle tear in his right thigh. Messi returned three weeks later. And then 20 minutes into a game, away to Betis last November, Messi hobbled off with another thigh muscle tear, now in his left left leg. This time however, there would be shortcuts to recovery, and Messi was to sit out for two months of the season.

Messi hobbled off after just 20 minutes, during a 4-1 win away to Real Betis last November.

Upon Messi’s return there were periods of genuine brilliance. At the Etihad in February, the Argentine was sublime. In a game during which Barça dominated much of the play, with a brutal pace in possession, beween Xavi and Iniesta in particular, Messi was free to exploit the space left by City’s attempts to close down Barça’s midfield - who at times looked as though they were only playing amongst themselves. Messi tortured and tormented Vincent Kompany and the hapless Dimechelis throughout the entire game. Ultimately, the English side were fortunate to escape with only a 2-0 defeat. A month later in Madrid, during the course of the second El Clasico of the season, Messi scored a hat trick during a thrilling 4-3 victory, in what was his, and Barça’s, best display of the season.

But these were increasingly rare displays of brilliance. Barça won only eleven of their final nineteen league games, following Messi’s return. There was a tepid capitulation at home to a resurgent Valencia, with Messi effectively reduced to a spectator for much of the second half. It was a similar story weeks later in San Sebastian, as Barça were beat 3-1 by an excellent Real Sociedad side. This game followed an increasingly familiar template. Barça enjoyed much of the possession and Messi scored an excellent equalizer, but increasingly, he also cut a frustrated figure and found it difficult to assert his influence on the course of the game, failing to achieve any meaningful penetration.

The low point of their league form came in March, with an embarrassing away defeat to relegation threatened Valladolid (who were eventually relegated), despite again, controlling the bulk of possession. Barça, and Messi in particular, were unable to break down their opposition - who were content in putting vast numbers of men in front of Messi and asking him to try and break them down. What was more concerning, was the worrying body language, the remonstrating with team mates, and the seeming disinterest in matches.

But the real moment of genuine crisis came during the Champions League Semi final, against Atletico Madrid.

Barça’s defeat to Atletico could (and should have been) as comprehensive as their defeat to Bayern, a year previous. It is not exaggeration to state that Barça could conceivably have been 3-0 down, inside ten minutes. When not in possession, Atletico defended, as they have done for three years under Diego Simeone, with all eleven men. Against Barça, Juanfran and Luis Felipe were both deployed no wider than their own 18-yard box; effectively ceding the flanks to Barça, in order to force them to attack from wide - knowing that in the absence of any concerted genuine wide threat, and with no aerial targets, Barça were pretty much done for. Throughout the entire miserable 90 minutes, for Barça fans, Messi was effectively a passenger.

He dropped out wide right and attempted to assert his influence as he has done so often, with the trademark drop of his shoulder, cutting inside onto his left foot (see below video), but faced with a box full of Atletico players who were willing to run through walls for their manager, there was simply no way through. When continued attempted attacks broke down in succession, the sight of a forlorn Messi making no attempt to win the ball back, became a depressingly familiar facet of the game. Not able to influence the game in any way shape or form, not capable (or willing) to have any meaningful impact in defence - Messi was effectively a passenger in a Barça team that still looks to him in times of desperation to be the difference.

But something far worse, and far more more serious, was also evident. The alluded to 'trademark drop of the shoulder' and burst of acceleration, that has conspired to embarrass the world’s elite defenders over the last decade, was agonisingly absent from view. Following the loss in Madrid, Messi was (for the first time) openly criticised in the Catalan press, and by some sections of The Barça support; for which he remains to the majority almost a civic religion. Upon their return to Barcelona, following the Copa Del Rey final defeat to Real, a sizeable number of disgruntled supporters met them upon their return to Camp Nou to voice their anger, with Messi being the focal point of much of it.

The main focus of attack against the Argentine, and one that was the most quoted, was that he was ‘saving himself’ for the World Cup at the expense of the club who had effectively raised him as their own. There was a shocking drop off in Messi’s work rate. During Barça’s defeat to Atletico two players covered less ground than Messi;

Thibauld Coutois and Jose Pinto.

At the season’s end, a Barcelona director argued that Messi had been furious at the Camp Nou leadership for “turning their back” on him during his tax evasion scandal, and stated that it was widely believed inside the club that Messi had used the El Clasico in March as a bargaining chip, by which the club was warned that Messi could (and would) turn on his prodigious talents, when and wherever he pleased. The same director also coined the now infamous phrase of Messi deliberately adopting a ‘Go Slow’ season, in revenge for what he saw as a slight against his influence at Camp Nou.

But aside from Messi’s woes, lies a deeper truth in the problems at Camp Nou - an increasingly Post-Tiki-Taka footballing landscape. 

Since Barça last won the Champions League in 2011, there has been a sea change in the blueprint for teams wanting to win the greatest club honour on earth. Teams who are physically imposing, who possess pace, speed, and power. Teams who are comfortable with having to soak up prolonged periods of pressure, but during transitions in play, possess enough genuine world class talent that are capable of ruthlessly exploiting the opposition's propensity for mistakes, when the opportunity arises. A ruthless model of ‘Power Football’ - that only a few years ago had been deemed all but obsolete.

The brutal reality is that thoughout this period, Barça’s refusal to adapt to these new demands, never abandoning Messi’s beloved 4-3-3, or indeed their over reliance on his influence, has seen them increasingly left behind. This reality has been masked by the uneasy fact that Messi and Barça ply their domestic trade in a league that is often so devoid of any genuine competitive opposition that it borders upon the farcical. Eleven times last season Barça hit domestic opponents by four goals or more. Three times by more than a six goal margin.

Time and again, when they have come up against the elite of European football, they have been found out to be hopelessly unequipped in dealing with the harsher footballing climate that they must now operate in. Against Chelsea (11/12), Bayern Munich (12/13), and Atletico Madrid (13/14), Barcelona faced European opposition whose physically imposing teams were willing to allow Barça the time in possession that they so crave and demand; yet utterly overwhelmed the Catalans.

These teams shared a ruthless dynamic, based around what, until only recently, had been considered a physicality which was deemed obelsete. Power in defending and set plays.

There have been no ‘free rides’ in these teams for any individual player. They have carried no passengers. Diego Costa often cut an increasingly isolated figure in matches on the way to Atletico’s La Liga triumph and Champions League final appearance last season; yet he revelled in this isolation. Costa never failed to make the thankless runs into the opposition’s channels, to stretch defences and create space, through which a host of Atletico players exploited all season long. When Costa was injured at the back end of the season, Adrian stepped into the role seamlessly, stepping in front of the opposition whenever they took control of possession. There is no over reliance on any individual players.

Diego Costa, reveling in isolation.

Elsewhere, Pep Guardiola’s Bayern Munich macabre dismantling at the hands of Real Madrid, only illustrated what for many observers has been patently obvious for some time. As it was reported back in Catalonia; "It’s an unavoidable thought: Barcelona’s crisis is, at the same time, Guardiola’s crisis, even if they are separated by a distance of a thousand kilometres.”

Bayern, like Barça, are fortunate in that they compete in an equally multi-tiered domestic competition, where its opposition will, more often than not, dutifully play the part of sacrificial lambs. But in European competition, Guardiola’s men were decimated, playing a possession based game that had effectively already proved to be to be tactically inept during his last campaign in Europe in 2012.

During Real Madrid’s 4-0 win in Munich, Bayern had plenty of possession, but Guardiola's men lacked the ability to move the ball around with the same tempo as his great Champions League winning teams had done previously. Chasing a one goal deficit from the first leg, Guardiola positioned Müller higher up the pitch, to play just just off Mario Mandzukic in a 4-3-2-1. But in reality, it was almost a conventional 4-4-2 at times, as both joined one another in attack, searching for a breakthrough that never came. It was a staggering display of tactical naivety, or arrogance, by a double Champions League winning coach.

With both Arjen Robben and Frank Ribery unable to find any penetration, and with Mandzukic and Müller often bypassed in the run of play; Toni Kroos and Bastian Schweinstiger were simply over run in midfield. Faced with the attacking onslaught of Angel Di Maria, Gareth Bale and Cristiano Ronaldo, the Bavarians were simply swept aside, and overwhelmed by the ruthlessness though which they were continually broke on. Overwhelmed by the sheer power and speed of their play.

What hurt the Germans, and drew the ire of the German press and Bayern supporters alike, was the fact that Carlo Ancelotti had simply adopted the Bayern blueprint under Jupp Heynkes, who only a year earlier, had carried out its own demolition job over Barça. It had now seemingly adopted a style of possession football that has increasingly been abandoned by teams winning the highest honours in world football.

Bayern fell short of expectations when met with Carlo Ancelotti's Real Madrid side.

Where Now For Messi and Barça?

Barça’s symbiotic relationship with Messi has been based upon a dumfoundingly simply proposition. As long as he turns it on it possession, he is free to roam the pitch, and have none of the on-field responsibilities shared by his teammates. It is testament to his abilities that few players have ever questioned this, or openly challenged its legitimacy. Even Zlatan gracefully accepted the role of dutiful subordinate. No easy feat.

But what about if increasingly, Messi doesn’t hold up to his end of the bargain? In his absence from Barça’s lineup last season, other players flourished - released from the restrictions placed upon them by Messi’s presence.

Cesc Fabregas enjoyed the best period of form in his Barça career; freed up to make the devastating runs from deep that menaced English football. There were marginal adaptions to Barça’s play as well; again centred on Fabregas. There was a new willingness to go more direct, utilising Fabregas’ greater range of passing than both Xavi and Iniesta. Alexis Sanchez too looked, for the first time since his arrival at Camp Nou, the world class talent he had been in Italy. Neymar too had quietly integrated himself well into the Barça team, with steady if not spectacular performances. He was improving each game and his influence was increasinlgly being felt.

Upon Messi’s return, Sanchez again reverted to a more marginal figure, finding himself isolated out wide. As did Fabregas, who eventually lost his place following Messi’s return. When he was used, it was often wide left as part of a front three, where he struggled to have any meaningful impact and subsequently became a scapegoat for much of Barcelona’s failings; openly jeered at Camp Nou. What is more worrying, as much as his negative influence on other players, is the fact that Messi’s return precipitated Barça’s domestic collapse.

Barça have ceded more to Messi than any other player in their illustrious history. But as long as the returns are consistent, and silverware continues to be accumulated at Camp Nou, then this can be justified. But Barça haven’t won a European competition for three years. Last campaign they finished without any competitive silverware for the first time in six seasons. They were again, outclassed in Europe (and domestically) - wedded to a system that panders to Messi’s demands at the expense of other talent surrounding him, whilst allowing him extended periods of recovery, afforded to no other player.

At what point do Barça simply say the words that Messi has thus far never heard?

No.

Messi is fast approaching the zenith of his footballing powers, which will present both he and Barça with a new set of problems. There has been the ongoing battle in the Catalan capital of getting Messi to embrace a more ‘athletic’ high protein diet of fish and white meat - to no avail. Preferring as he does, the staple red meat diet favoured by Argentine players. Thus far, this has elicited little more than mild annoyance within the hierarchy at Camp Nou. But as Messi approaches his later years, the effects (or lack off) effective conditioning and dietary discipline will become more pronounced. This simple facet of biological mechanics will not be lost on those who wield power. Those wary of the rapid physical decline so often seen in South American players as they approach seniority within the game.

The way Messi uses his low centre of gravity to elude tackles and get away from opposition players is predicated upon that trademark initial burst of pace that allows him to bypass their intentions. Through the back end of last season, and during the World Cup in Brazil, this was becoming an all too rare sight.

Given the sheer scale of Messi’s appearances is this really any wonder?

Having played over three-hundred competitive games in just six seasons. Given the absence of any effective management programme, what is more astonishing is that it has taken this long for any effects to become noticeable.

There are a multitude of commercial imperatives hanging over Barça right now. There is a new Stadium to pay for, and as Bartomeu has already shown during his brief tenure, he is just as relentless in pursuing any possible commercial venture, in order to feed Barça’s scramble for capital, as was his predecessor, Sandro Rosell. The window for making the sort of historically monumental financial return on Messi is closing fast. Another season of domestic and European underachievement will be a serious blow to FC Barcelona, and one that they can ill afford. If the Sheiks or the Qatari’s come knocking next summer, with the sort of transfer fee that would effectively pay for the New Stadium, it is difficult to see how Barça could turn down such an offer.

But Messi’s future and that of Barça perhaps rests with someone we haven’t spoke of yet.

Luis Suarez.

A more ruthless competitor and goal scorer doesn’t exist in world football right now. Messi has been lucky, since the departures of Samuel Eto’o and Thierry Henry - Messi has answered to no one. David Villa was moved on at Messi’s behest, Zlatan lasted a season before leaving the Camp Nou and is currently enjoying the best form of his life. As Messi’s hegemony grew at Camp Nou so did his influence on the pitch.

The evidence is bore out that during Barça’s first Champions League triumph under Guardiola, in 2008/09, their front three contributed to an incredible century of goals between them; Messi (38) Eto’o (36) and Henry (26). Fast forward to Barça’s last league-winning campaign in 2012, during which, Messi bagged a simply dumbfounding 60 goals in fifty games, the dependency on Messi is overwhelming. Barça’s next two top scorers were David Villa and Cesc Fabregas with 14 and 13 goals a piece, respectively.

But Luis Suarez is a different beast, who will not meekly and dutifully accept his place as a bit part. Suarez will look to terrorize Spanish opposition as soon as he is he free to return from his FIFA-imposed exile. The scene could be set for the one of the most sensational power struggles ever seen at the Camp Nou. If it is centred around the talents of the pair, then it truly could reinvigorate both Barça and Messi to even higher footballing feats. If however, like so often, it degenerates into an attritious battle of egos, it could well signal the end of either’s career at Camp Nou. If Suarez lights up La Liga upon his return, which is difficult not to see, then I wouldn’t like to bet on which one heads for the exit.